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I. Introduction
In the summer of 2002, a "miniature war" that was barely mentioned in the U.S. press
erupted between Spain and Morocco in what some commentators dubbed a "microcosm
of the clash of civilizations."' The clash erupted over an island called "Isla de Perejil" by
the Spanish and "Leila Island" by the Moroccans.2 This island is part of a series of Spanish
possessions in Morocco that date back to the fifteenth century.3 In 1960, Spain and Morocco
signed an agreement that neither country would establish a permanent presence on Perejil.
4
Accordingly, Spain withdrew the island's last permanent inhabitants, Spanish Foreign Le-
gionnaires, forty years ago.' On July 11, 2002, Morocco stormed the island and ended the
forty-year-old status quo. 6 Spain quickly reacted with an invasion and returned the situation
to the status quo ante thus avoiding a Moroccan fait accompli.
Seizure of the island, however, is not Morocco's main concern. Ceuta and Melilla, Span-
ish city port enclaves on Morocco's north coast, are the real source of the current tensions
between Morocco and Spain.' Since gaining independence, Morocco has claimed the en-
claves and the island. Spain, however, has claimed them as well. 9 Seemingly, the seizure of
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1. See Julian Schvindleman, Spain's Double Standard, MIAMI HERALD, Op Ed., Aug. 9, 2002, at 7B.
2. Guardian Unlimited, Anyone for Parsley? Spain and Morocco Disagree on Everything to Do With This Rocky
Islet in the Strait of Gibraltar, Including Its Name (July 19, 2002), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/spain/
article/0,2763,757803,00.html [hereinafter Anyone for Parsley?].
3. Terra.com, La Isla de Pereily Otros Enclaves Espafioles en el Norte de Africa (July 22, 2002), available at
http://www.bolsami.com/discu/_discu/0000002f.htm [hereinafter La Isla].
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the island was a litmus test of Spanish resolve to use force to defend the enclaves of Melilla
and Ceuta.o
II. The Battle over the Enclaves
A. EARLY HISTORY AND ESTABLISHING TITLE
In 711, the Goths, rulers of Spain, controlled Ceuta." That same year the armies of Islam
sacked Ceuta, allied themselves with the Gothic commander of the city-port and invaded
Spain. It would not be until 1415 when a Portuguese protectorate was established over the
city that Ceuta would revert to European control again. 2 In 1578, Moroccan forces defeated
a Portuguese army in four hours at AI-Ksar al-Kebir, 13 thus plunging Portugal into chaos
as its king was killed and its army wasted.' 4 That same year, Spain annexed Portugal and
declared a presidio over Ceuta. I" In 1581, Perejil and Ceuta were brought under Spanish
control for the first time after Portugal ceded the territories to Spain.16 The union ended
in 1640, and in 1663 Ceuta opted to remain a Spanish presidio.17 In 1668, Portugal and
Spain signed a treaty ending the War of Restoration, which resulted in Portugal ceding all
claims to the island and Ceuta.' Melilla was made a Spanish possession in 1497 five years
after the Reconquista of Spain which drove the Muslim invaders out of Spain, but before
Pamplona joined the Kingdom of Castillay Leon in 1512.'1
Spain's Moroccan territories were tranquil until 1859 when a revolt broke out against
Spanish rule in Ceuta. 20 The Spanish quickly crushed the six-month revolt and its North
African possessions grew slightly due to concessions made by the Moroccan Sultan."' In
1893, a revolt broke out again against Spanish rule-this time in Melilla.22 Spain had to
rush more than 15,000 reinforcements to the presidio.2' After the Spanish-American War,
known in Spain as el Desastre (the disaster), Spain had only its barren rocks, the two cities
10. Caldwell, supra note 4.
11. John A. Crow, Spain the Root and the Flower: An Interpretation of Spain and the Spanish People, 3rd
Edition, (Univ. of California Press, 1985).
12. See id. Henry the Navigator participated in the campaign against the city. See ERNESTO VEGA PAGAN, EL
ROL DE LOS PORTUGUESES EN EL DESCUBRIMIENTO DEL NUEVO MUNDO (1990).
13. See JOHN P. CANN, COUNTERINSURGENCY IN AFRICA: THE PORTUGUESE WAY OF WAR, 1961-1974(Green-
wood Publishing Group, 1997). King Sebastiao was killed and onlv 100 of his 15,000-strong army survived the
battle.
14. Stanley G. Payne, A History of Spain and Portugal: Volume 1, The Library of Iberian Resources Online,
available at http://libro.uca.edu/payneI/payneI2.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2003).
15. See Josf E. ALVAREZ, THE BETROTHED OF DEATH: THE SPANISH FOREIGN LEGION DURING THE RIF RE-
BELLION, 1920-1927 (2001).
16. See La Crisis de Ia Isla de Pereil, EL MUNDO, July 17, 2002, available at http://www.elmundo.es/2002/
graficos/jul/s2/islote.btnl.
17. See DIAz DE VILLEGAS, PLAZAS V PROVINCIAS AFRICANAS ESPANOLAS I (Institute de Estudios Aficanos,
1963).
18. See id.
19. See id. at 3.
20. See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 1.
21. See DAVID S. WOOLSIAN, REBELS IN THE RIF: ABD EL KRIM AND THE RIF REBELLION 33 (Stanford Univ.
Press, 1968).
22. See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 1.
23. Id.
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of Ceuta and Melilla, Ifini (in Morocco), Rio de Oro (present day Spanish Sahara), and
Equatorial Guinea (in central Africa).14
In 1909, again rebellion erupted outside Melilla."s The rebellion is important for two
reasons. First, it occurred soon after el Desastre, and second, the post-el Desastre officer corps
saw action for the first time.26 Among these officers was Francisco Franco, the future dic-
tator of Spain. 7 The territory remained in various stages of conflict until full rebellion
erupted in 1919.28 That year the Spanish authorities created the Spanish Foreign Legion
in Ceuta? 9 The Spanish Foreign Legion would eventually be commanded by Franco and
used as shock troops in Morocco and the Spanish Civil War. Herein lays the bond between
Spain's current leadership and its Splendid Little War: the African enclaves were the launch-
ing point of both the 800-year Muslim domination of Spain, and Franco's civil war move-
ment which provided the training grounds for future heroes of the Spanish Civil War.30
B. MODERN ROOT OF THE CURRENT CONFLICT
Morocco gained independence in 1956." Spain, however, held onto Melilla, Ceuta, Ifini,
the Spanish Sahara, as well as the islands of Chafarinas, Alhucemas, de Velez, de la Gomera,
and Perejil32 Morocco maintained the position that the two enclaves, Melilla and Ceuta,
were colonies. 3 Regardless, the United Nations (UN) refused to list them as colonies, citing
that Spaniards had lived on them long before Morocco ever existed.14 Morocco began
incursions into Ifini in 1957.15 After minor clashes, Spain ceded Ifini to Morocco in 1969.16
To the south of Morocco, Spain retained the Spanish Sahara, developing the phosphate
deposits that were discovered in 1945 near Bou-Craa. 7 In 1972, a group of students founded
the Frente Popular para la Liberacion de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario).'5 The fol-
lowing year with the help of Libya, Polisario launched a guerilla campaign to oust the
Spanish from the Sahara."9 With Franco in the twilight of his life, Spain was concerned
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id.
26. See SEBASTIAN BALFOUR, DEADLY EMBRACE: MOROCCO AND THE ROAD TO THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR 24-
29 (Oxford Univ. Press, 2002).
27. See ALVAREZ, supra note 15, at 3. Franco did not arrive in Morocco until 1912. He did, however, take
part in all major battles, often leading the charges himself. Id. at 247-49.
28. BALFOUR, supra note 26, at 57.
29. Id. at 13. The Rif Rebellion lasted until 1927.
30. See PAUL PRESTON, FRANCO: A BIOGRAPHY 133-63 (Harper Collins Publishers, 1994); see also ALVAREZ,
supra note 15, at 249.
31. See ALAN C.G. BEST & HARM J. DE BLij, AFRICAN SURVEY 561 (John Wiley & Sons, 1977). In March,
Morocco gained independence from France. In April, Morocco gained independence from Spain.
32. Id.
33. La Isla, supra note 3.
34. PETER GOLD, EUROPE OR AFRICA? A CONTEMIPORARY STUDY OF THE SPANISH NORTH AFRICAN ENCLAVES
OF CEUTA AND MELILLA xiii (Liverpool Univ. Press, 2000).
35. See PRESTON, supra note 30, at 672.
36. BEST & BLiJ, supra note 31, at 561.
37. See PATRICK BROGAN, WORLD CONFLICTS: VHY AND WHERE THEY ARE HAPPENING 55 (Bloomsbury,
1992).
38. Id.
39. See C.R. PENNELL, MOROCCO SINCE 1830: A HISTORY 337 (Powell Publishing, 2000).
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"History of Perejil Island"
Since 1415, the contested island belonged to Portuguese administered Ceuta. In
1581, the Spanish took over the island. Portugal recognized Spanish sovereignty in
1668, though Spain did not exercise any sovereignty over the island until 1779 when
a military reconnaissance expedition arrived on the island. During the Napoleonic
Wars, the British occupied the island until 1813. In 1836, Washington approached
Spain with the intention of building a coaling station on the island, an idea the British
persuaded Spain to reject.
In 1894, rumors began to circulate that the Sultan of Morocco ceded all claims to
the island and sovereignty to Britain. The treaty dividing Morocco between Spain
and France makes no mention of the island. A detachment of Spanish Foreign Le-
gionnaires occupied the island from the 1930s to the 1960s. Since then, the island
has been uninhabited. The Spanish statute setting up Ceuta's autonomy makes no
mention of Perejil. Morocco claims the island was liberated in 1956. In 1975, Mo-
rocco submitted the island and the other Spanish enclaves to the UN on Decolon-
ialization. The UN has declined to rule on their status.
La Isla de Perejil y Otros Enclaves Espanoles en el Norte de Africa, available at
http://www.Terra.com (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
more with a smooth transition to new leadership than with the Spanish Sahara.4 ° Thus, in
August 1974, Spain proposed a referendum for its colony.
4
'
The move took Morocco by surprise. King Hassan II, monarch since 1961, had barely
survived two previous coup attempts. 42 Furthermore, guerillas operated in the south of the
country.4 To buy time and to prepare his army, Hassan launched a complaint with the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague Convention.44 Spain meanwhile threw
its support to the Polisario Front.41 On October 15, 1975, a United Nations mission an-
nounced the results of the referendum: "[t]he majority of the population within Spanish
Sahara was manifestly in favor of independence." 4 The next day, the ICJ ruled there was
no "tie of territorial sovereignty between the Territory of Spanish Sahara and the Kingdom
of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity."47 King Hassan II, however, declared that the ICJ
had ruled in his favor and asked the Moroccans to join him for a Green March across the
frontier to re-occupy the territory.
48
40. BROGAN, supra note 37.
41. Id.
42. See R. ERNEST DuPuy & TREVOR N. Dupuy, THE HARPER ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MILITARY HISTORY 1435
(Book Sales, 1993). In 1971, military officers attacked the king at his palace. In 1972, his plane was attacked
by two Moroccan Air Force jets.
43. Id.
44. See Western Sahara: The Unfinished Struggle, available at http://,ww.rimbaud.freeserve.co.uk/westemsa-
hara.pdf (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
45. PENNELL,Supra note 39, at 338.
46. See BROGAN, supra note 37, at 57.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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C. THE GREEN MARCH
By October 21, 1975, there were 524,000 Moroccans at the border of the Spanish Sahara.
Because both Washington and Paris supported King Hassan, Spain, which was preoccupied
by Franco's succession, broke off its support to Polisario.49 In addition, Morocco amassed
25,000 troops, which outnumbered Spain's 20,000.0 On October 21, 1975, Spain opened
negotiations with Morocco and seven days later began evacuating the colony.5" On Novem-
ber 5, 1975, in the "Green March" some 300,000 Moroccans crossed the border waving
flags, the King's portrait, and the Koran." On November 8, 1975, Spain capitulated and
later agreed, on November 14, 1975, to withdraw from the colony by February 1976."
During the conflict, Morocco also claimed Ceuta and Melilla, demanding that they be
placed under Moroccan control. Spain responded by dispatching several gunboats to the
ports. 54 Spain sent a clear message; an encroachment on the enclaves would be treated very
differently than either Ifini or the Spanish Sahara. The line-in-the-sand had been drawn.
Spain would not pull out of the enclaves. On November 20, 1975, Franco died." Spain's
empire was reduced to Melilla, Ceuta, and the islands of Chafarinas, Alhucemas, de Velez,
de la Gomera, and Pereji.6 The empire now occupied thirty-two square kilometers and
was populated by 120,000 Spaniards. 7
The transfer of the Spanish Sahara gave the enclaves a respite from Moroccan claims for
at least a decade. Morocco also ceased to bring up the issue of the enclaves to the United
Nations Decolonialization Committee." According to one commentator, "[t]his was due
to Morocco's desire to avoid a confrontation with the UN over self-determination for
Western Sahara." 59 Morocco and Spain even held naval exercises in 1985 during which the
Spanish Naval Staff in Spain, ironically, prepared contingency plans for the defense of the
enclaves. 60
The detente ended in January 1987 when the King sent Spain a proposal to end Spain's
presence in the enclaves. 61 Spain never responded to the "committee of experts" recom-
mendation. Hassan also implied that if the British ever handed Gibraltar back to Spain,
then Spain must follow suit and hand over the enclaves to Morocco. 62 As if on cue, local
49. See Khalil Osman, The Elusive Quest for Peace in the Western Sahara, available at http://www.
muslimedia.com/archives/oaw98/sahara.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Elusive Peace].
50. See BEST & BLIJ, supra note 31, at 563.
51. See BROGAN, supra note 37, at 57. The zoo was emptied and all animals were taken to another zoo in
Spain. The cemetery was emptied of all Spanish corpses, which were relocated to the Canary Islands.
52. Id. See also BEST & BLIJ, supra note 31, at 563. Green is the color of Mohammed and is thus the color
of peace. DAVID LAMB, THE ARABS: JOURNEYS BEYOND THE MIRAGE 298 (Random House, 1987).
53. See Elusive Peace, supra note 49.
54. See BEST & BLIJ, supra note 31, at 564.
55. Francisco Franco, available at http://www.rochester.kl2.mn.us/kellogg/rodgers/core/wwtwo/franco.htm
(last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
56. See DI VILLEGAS, supra note 17, at 6.
57. See Spain's North African Enclaves, BBC NEws, July 17, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/
english/world/europe/newsid_2131000/213 1636.stm.
58. GOLD, supra note 34, at 12.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Id. at 9.
61. Id. at 7-8.
62. Id. at 7.
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Muslim leaders attempted to breach the border crossing.63 Violent demonstrations erupted
in February between Muslims and "cristianos," which is the term enclavers gave to those of
Spanish (non-Arab) Christian descent, in which twenty-two people were injured.64 In March
1987, violent demonstrations by people demanding to be Moroccan broke out in the Span-
ish territories.
65
In 1988, breaking their silence at the UN, Moroccan Foreign Affairs Minister, Abdelatif
Filali, stated:
It is imperative to resolve the dispute concerning the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and other
small Mediterranean Islands under Spanish occupation, in order to prevent this anachronistic
situation-consequence of earlier times-from threatening the essential harmony which should
prevail over the relations between the two countries situated on either side of the straight of
Gibraltar.6
Relations between the two countries improved in 1989 with King Hassan's first visit to
Spain. On July 6, 1991, both monarchs signed a Treaty of Friendship-Spain's first with
an Arab nation.67 The treaty covered the non-use of force, non-intervention in internal
affairs, peaceful settlements of disputes, respect for human rights, and human freedoms.
68
D. THE SPLENDID LITrLE WAR OF 2002: A WEDDING, A CRUISE, AND AN "INVASION"
1. Pressure on the Enclaves
Several events in the mid-1990s focused and highlighted the tensions that would even-
tually erupt into open conflict in 2002. In 1995, Morocco called the enclaves "an integral
part of Moroccan territory ... the last colonies in Africa. ' '69 That same year, Spain finally
approved a plan that made the enclaves autonomous regions, but the plan was not quite on
par with those of the Basques, Andalusians, and Catalans. 0 Morocco vehemently con-
demned the passage of the acts. On April 28, 1995, two bomb attacks occurred in Ceuta.
A group called the "21 August Organisation [sic] for the Liberation of Occupied Moroccan
Territories" claimed responsibility.7' Many in the enclaves suspected the Moroccan secret
service.
72
In 1995, the European Union (EU) began to enact the Schengen Accords, which weak-
ened internal border control within the Union. 73 Virtually overnight, Spain, a country which
emigrated more people than it immigrated, was faced with hitherto unknown illegal im-
migration through Ceuta and Melilla. 74 By 2000, twenty to twenty-five illegal immigrants
63. Id. at 106-07.
64. Id.
65. THE PRS GROUP, CEUYTA ND MELILLA AND OTHER AFRICAN ENCLAVES (1987).
66. El Ministro de Exteriores Marroqui Reivindica Ceuta y Melilla en la ONU, EL PAls, Oct. 8, 1988,
available at http://uw.elpais.es.
67. ArabicNews.com, Morocco and Spain Pledge to Give New. Momentum to Bilateral Relations (Apr. 30, 1999),
available at htp://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/990430/1999043 034.html.
68. GOLD, supra note 34, at 16.
69. Id. at 21.
70. Id. at 50.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. George Stolz, Europe's Back Doors (Jan. 1, 2000), available at http://vww.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/01/
001stolz.htm.
74. Id.
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entered the two enclaves each day.7" Moroccans, the backbone of the enclaves' economy,
were allowed to come into the enclaves unhindered, but were restricted from using the
maritime and air links to Europe.7 6 Moroccans who overstayed were simply deported.
2. Prelude to the Splendid Little War
In 1994, the Spanish army, still reorganizing after the Franco years, instituted El Plan
Norte.7" It was a top-to-bottom reorganization of the army. It refocused the army away from
being a garrison army controlling the independence-minded Catalans and Basques, to a
modern NATO army projecting force externally rather than internally."M The focus of this
force projection was North Africa, particularly the Maghreb nations.75 Protecting the
African enclaves and Spanish territorial sovereignty was now the priority of the Spanish
military.8 0
On July 23, 1999, the elderly King Hassan II died, and his son succeeded to the throne
as Mohammed VI. There were doubts that the young king could hold power and it was
widely acknowledged that if internal Moroccan politics worsen, the enclaves would be used
as a rallying point.,, Shortly after Mohammed VI's ascension, the Spanish President Jose
Maria Aznar visited Morocco in an attempt to smooth over deteriorated relations."2 The
two met in a room where the enclaves were marked as Moroccan. 3 The Moroccan Prime
Minister stated: "the current status cannot last."14 In response, Aznar declared, "[w]e are
not going to pay any attention to any Moroccan claims.""s
By 2001, litanies of Moroccan concerns, such as illegal immigration, border control has-
sles, drug smuggling, fishing rights, and the status of the enclaves, were straining Moroccan-
Spanish relations. Morocco recalled its ambassador to Spain in October 2001, as attempts
to negotiate the disputes made no progress.8 6 In January 2002, it called the proposed Spanish
oil prospecting off the Canary Islands an "unfriendly act."8 "
3. A Wedding, a Cruise, and an Invasion
King Mohammed VI announced that he was getting married and that there would be a
royal wedding in April 2002.11 Due to a rise in Israeli-Palestinian violence, however, the
King decided to postpone his celebrations until July.89 Either by sheer coincidence, dumb
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Geoffrey B. Demarest, Spain's Miliay-Strategic Outlook, available at http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/





82. Paul Reynolds, Analysis: Spanish or Moroccan land? BBC NEws, July 16, 2002, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid-2131000/2131853.stm; THE EcoNomsST, The Mayor and the




86. THE PRS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE, Aug. 1, 2002.
87. Spain Rattles Sabre at Morocco, BBC NEWS, July 12, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/europe/newsid-2124000/2124418.stm.
88. See ArabicNews.com, Ceremonies of King Mohammed's Wedding in Morocco as of Friday, available at
http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/Daily/Day/020709/2002070915.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
89. Id.
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luck, or provocation, Spain decided to send warships for a cruise near Perejil Island.'
Embarrassed that his wedding celebrations would be overshadowed, the King sent in a
dozen soldiers and raised the Moroccan flag over Perejil on July 11, 2002.9' It was the first
invasion of Western European territory since World War II, and it did not sit well in Spain.
At first Morocco downplayed the invasion and stated that they were merely looking at
smuggling activities on the 500 yard island, which lies a mere 220 yards from the Moroccan
coastline.92 Spain and the EU asked for the Moroccan troops to leave the island, but the
requests were met with silence.93 Then on July 12, 2002, Moroccan patrol boats were
spotted near Melilla around the Chafarinas Islands. Spain dispatched troops to the Cha-
farinas to avert a similar fait accompli.94 Spain then dispatched warships off the coast of
Ceuta.95 On July, 17, amid silence from Morocco, Spain recalled its ambassador from Mo-
rocco.96 As the EU dithered and debated, NATO issued a communiqu6 describing the
Moroccan invasion as "an unfriendly act." 7 The enclaves, however, were expressly outside
of NATO's defensive area. Thus, all defenses fell solely to Spain."
At dawn on July 17, 2002, twenty-eight members of the Spanish Special Forces landed
on Perejil2 9 Using bullhorns, they asked the Moroccan contingent, now reduced to six
men, to surrender.00 Without firing a shot, the Moroccans ended their invasion.'0' The
Spanish Foreign Minister said the action "was not an attempt to impose any solution by
force, but rather to restore the island to the previous status quo."'02 Morocco responded
by saying "the island is an integral part of Moroccan territory.' 1 3 Spain also beefed up its
garrisons in Ceuta and Melilla.1'a The "Spanish Street" was solidly behind Aznar's unilateral
move. 0 15 On July 20, 2002, Spain withdrew from Perejil after American pressure to stop
fighting, which Washington had been applying since the wedding festivities. °6 As of this
writing, both sides have met to try to sooth over relations.
90. The Moroccan foreign minister even lodged a protest over the cruise.
91. See Caldwell, supra note 4.
92. See id.
93. Id.
94. Spain Rattles Sabre at Morocco, supra note 87.
95. Id.
96. Spain Recalls Envoy in Island Row, BBC NEws, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/eu-
rope/newsid_2132000/2132 793.stm (last visited July 17, 2002).
97. See Caldwell, supra note 4.
98. GOLD, supra note 34, at 152. However, NATO leaders have made various comments indicating that
NATO may step in if the enclaves were directly threatened.
99. Keith B. Richburg, Spanish Commandos Evict Moroccans from Island; Pre-Dawn Assault Threatens to Escalate
Territorial Dispute, VASH. POST, July 18, 2002, at A22.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Spain Retakes- Moroccan Island, available at http://pub I5.ezboard.com/fpoliticsofthepeoplefrm2.
showMessage?topicID = 267.topic (last visited Feb. 13, 2003).
103. Richburg, supra note 99.
104. Leslie Crawford, Spain Protests at Morocco 'Invasion,' FIN. TIMES, July 13, 2002, at PS.
105. In a series of questions asked of its readers, even El Pais's-"flagship paper of Spain's left intelligent-
sia"-readers were behind the repulse. Asked, "Do you believe justified the Spanish Military intervention on
Perejil?", 72 percent said yes, compared to 26 percent who said no. The same readers emphatically rejected
an exclusive diplomatic option by 71 percent to 27 percent. In a similar poll conducted on the day of the
Spanish invasion, ElMundo-Spain's leading newspaper-showed an incredible 92 percent approval formilitary
intervention. See Spaniards Back Perejil Military Action, BBC NEWS, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/eng-
lish/world/europe/newsid_2134000/2134265.stm (last visited July 17, 2002).
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ll. Legal Analysis: Territorial Acquisition and International Law
Under international law, a state may traditionally acquire territory in the following five
ways: 0 7 discovery, cession, accretion, conquest, and prescription." 8 There is a new interplay,
however, that is advocated by leading international law jurists that seeks to commingle these
traditional modes with self determination principles and critical dates.°9
A. CESSION/CONQUEST
Spain bases its tide to the enclaves on Portugal's cession in the sixteenth century and its
conquest of Melilla." 0 Cession is defined as "the relinquishment or transfer of land from
one state to another.""' However, "the title it confers is derivative in the sense that its
validity is dependent upon the validity of the title of the ceding State.""2 Therefore, in
order to ascertain Spain's claim of legitimate title, one has to look at Portugal's acquisition
of the territories, focusing on Ceuta and Perejil. Portugal gained tide through "conquest."
Spain did likewise with Melilla. The right of conquest is the right of the victor to sovereignty
over the defeated land and its inhabitants. "3 Before World War II, conquest was recognized
in international law.114 Fortunately, international law no longer holds this view."15 None-
theless, at one time conquest was a valid form of acquiring tide to land. Three criteria had
to be met for effective conquest: (a) there had to be a forceful taking in times of war;
(b) the victor must occupy the territory with the intention of extending its own national
sovereignty over the territory; and (c) the control must be effective and uncontested." 6
Therefore, by application of the intertemporal doctrine, which demands that the validity
of legal rights must be determined by the law in effect when the right was created, Portugal
had a valid title to the lands in question." 7 As sovereign, Portugal could legally transfer its
rights in the sixteenth century to Spain. Thus, Spain has maintained continued, uninter-
rupted tide to Melilla since 1497.
B. PRESCRIPTION
Morocco will argue that Spain's title from Portugal is defective based on the fact that
conquest is no longer recognized. Therefore, Spain's claim to Melilla is faulty because it is
based on expired modes of acquisition. If that argument is accepted, discarding intertem-
106. Ed McCullough, Spain, Morocco Reach Accord, U.S. Intervenes to Help Resolve Rift Over Uninhabited Islet,
\VAsH. PosT, July 21, 2002, at A1 6.
107. Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of TerritorialAcquisition in International Law and
A Modest Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000).
108. Id. at 2.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Richburg, supra note 99.
111. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 221 (7th ed. 1999).
112. Lee, supra note 107, at 6.
113. d. at 11.
114. Id.
115. See Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
116. Lee, supra note 107, at 11.
117. See United States v. Netherlands, Permanent Court of Arbitration 1928.
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poral issues and historical dates of acquisition, Morocco must still overcome another theory
that Spain will use to trump Morocco's claims-prescription. Prescription is the interna-
tional equivalent of the common law's adverse possession. Possession and the actual exercise
of sovereignty prolonged over a period allow a cure in a defective title. A check to pre-
scription is that it must be undisturbed. If the country from which the territory is seized
manifests continuous dissent and objection, prescription is defeated."' Prescription can be
divided into two camps: (a) acquisitive and (b) extinctive. Acquisitive prescription involves
long term, peaceful possession of a territory with no other claimant protesting the posses-
sion. Spain never accepted the Muslim invasion and fought vigorously, until it was able to
reassert itself throughout the Iberian Peninsula. Extinctive prescription "involves the pos-
session, although originally wrongful, of such a long term that it ultimately stops the de-
posed state from asserting its claim.""' Therefore, Spain will argue that Morocco is es-
topped from laying claim to the islands.
C. CONTIGUITY
Morocco's main argument is that the islands and the enclaves are contiguous to it. It is
a similar argument that Argentina has used over the Falklands.12 0 Contiguity, however, has
not been widely recognized in international law for acquiring territory.'2' One aspect sup-
porting Morocco's position but lacking to Argentina's is the proximity of the islands and
enclaves to Morocco-a distance measured in yards-compared to that of the Falklands,
which is over 500 miles from the mainland. Morocco will argue that the enclaves are in-
explicably tied to it through economic ties because the main source of income arises from
cross-border trade. This argument hurts Spain's interest the most because it is the same
argument it uses against the British for the return of Gibraltar. Undermining Spain's ar-
gument against the British, the Moroccans have tied the questions of the enclaves with that
of Gibraltar. The Moroccans argue that if Spain receives Gibraltar because of contiguity,
then, ipsofacto, the enclaves are "ours" under the same theory.
D. SELF-DETERMINATION
Self-determination is a legal concept that has been recognized in the latter half of the
twentieth century.12 2 Morocco has already had a negative brush with self-determination
when the ICJ ruled that the inhabitants of the Western Sahara could determine their own
future. 121 It appears that self-determination may trump even historical claims: "[g]enerally,
118. Lee, supra note 107, at 13; see alsoJames Francis Gravelle, Contemporary International Legal Issues-The
Falkland (Vlalvinas) Islands: an international aw analysis of the dispute between Argentina and Great Britain, Winter
1985, 107 MIL. L. REV. 5, 24 (1985).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 27.
121. Id.
122. See cf. UN Charter; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, available at http://
193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a-opt.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003); International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, available at http://193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/a-cescr.htm (last visited Apr. 10,
2003); Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, available at http://
193.194.138.190/html/menu3/b/c-coloni.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003); Advisory Opinion on the Legal Conse-
quences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.CJ. 16 (June 2 1, 1971).
123. Vestern Sahara, 1975 I.CJ. 12, 31-35 (Oct. 16, 1975).
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neighboring states have not been allowed to help themselves to adjacent territories on the
basis of historical claims; boundary readjustments must come as an expression of the dem-
ocratically expressed will of those subject to readjustment.' 2 4 Many argue that self-
determination should trump historical claims because if it doesn't "it will lead to endless
conflicts, as modern states find themselves under pressure to join a general reversionary
march backward to [an] . . .uncertain age and validity."' 2 5 The prime example of this is
East Timor. Morocco will argue that a plebiscite is meaningless because the majority of the
enclaves' citizens are cristianos. Legally, taking all issues into consideration, Spain may then
have the stronger of the two competing claims based on conquest, cession, prescription,
the still evolving right of self-determination, and historical dates analysis.
IV. Conclusion
The future of the enclaves is difficult to judge. With a growing Muslim population, the
steady emigration, and declining birthrate of cristianos, the enclaves will eventually have a
predominantly Muslim population. Those residents may advocate self-determination and
reunification with Morocco. Conversely, they may opt to stay within Spain and enjoy the
standards afforded by the EU. Spain will not give up the enclaves. To do so may unravel
Spain itself. With the Basques and Catalans seeking independence, jettisoning the enclaves,
which joined Spain earlier than the Autonomous Regions, may be a prelude to the complete
abandonment of Spain as a country. That is what Morocco and others do not understand.
Although time is on Morocco's side, it will ultimately be up to the enclaves' residents as to
where their destiny lies. Morocco will not present its case to the United Nations in the
near future, nor will it submit its claims to the ICJ. Morocco may attempt a repeat of its
"Green March" and hurl thousands of women and children onto the enclaves. This would
be Spain's worst-case-scenario and a public relations disaster because it may be forced to
respond with military action. As for the rocks, if Morocco ratchets up the tension, Spain
may sacrifice some of the lesser rocks to bide more time for the enclaves. Nevertheless,
Spain will avoid that slippery slope at all costs, as evidenced by their Splendid Little War.
124. Thomas Franck, The Stealing of the Sahara, 70 Am. J. INT'L L. 694, 697-98 (1976).
125. Id. at 698.
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